1. Threat landscape: Why CNI needs greater resilience #
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has introduced a new mix of cyber-kinetic threats to critical national infrastructure (CNI) that have never been experienced before. The adversary uses an almost unlimited pool of resources to attack Ukrainian infrastructure in both the physical and virtual worlds.
This white paper presents our experience of protecting the Ukrainian transmission system operator (TSO). It describes the security challenges we encountered and the solutions Cossack Labs developed and deployed for the energy sector. Our solutions are part of a wide gamut of measures the transmission system operator (TSO) uses to withstand complex cyber-kinetic threats that are applied in a simultaneous, coordinated manner: from the physical capture or destruction of communication paths and critical assets at substations and data centres, to sophisticated cyberattacks and attempts to disrupt or manipulate the people operating the system.
Critical infrastructure is subject to physical attacks, including power plants, substations, control rooms, communication channels, and data centres #
The threat landscape posed by cyberattacks is relatively well understood. Full-scale war, however, has added an additional dimension: the risk of losing connectivity, equipment, and people engaged in CNI operations. Thus, new factors have been identified that are worth consideration:
- Control rooms, data centres, substations, and power plants can be destroyed by a missile, drone or cyberattack, achieving the same operational result. Either way, the TSO loses visibility of the process and the ability to act on it. In the electricity sector, the inability to manage islanding can turn a local incident into a wider blackout.
- Communication channels are targets in their own right. Communication channels are also part of physical infrastructure and can be damaged or destroyed by physical attacks as well. Near real-time connectivity among energy assets, substations, and data centres is vital for managing the whole system, and damage to communication channels prevents operators from managing remote consumers—even if there is enough power to meet their needs.
- CNI operations must continue while physical threats persist. Infrastructure under attack cannot suspend operations until the threat passes, and no engineer can be sent to a substation being shelled. Every component must be operable, recoverable, and re-securable with as little human presence on site as possible.
Risks of an adversary physically taking over a data centre, substation, or power plant #
By capturing an energy object, the attacker gets physical access to an isolated national grid operational technology (OT) network. That inflates security measures delivered by perimeter-based air gapped approaches for OT infrastructure protection.
End devices and remote terminal units (RTUs) are inherently distributed and physically exposed. #
Field devices, which are spread across the service territory, are increasing: RTUs, sensors, meters, and distributed energy resources. This increases the attack surface and means that, under wartime conditions, the possibility of an endpoint being captured must also be considered.
Furthermore, when territory is occupied, substations and remote sites are taken over while still operating. The attacker then has full physical access to the equipment. They can open cabinets, read or remove memory, and connect their own tools. Attackers can take as long as they need without having to hide.
Legacy OT protocols are not designed for secure operations #
CNI networks still run on protocols designed for airgapped communication channels, such as Modbus, IEC 60870-5-101. Both were later encapsulated in TCP/IP without major redesign. They do not provide the risk-appropriate level of data/payload security. Anyone who reaches the network can read every value and directly send commands, and the equipment will accept them as if they came from the control centre. Opening breakers disconnects consumers immediately, as Industroyer did in 2016.
In summary, energy infrastructure often includes vast quantities of distributed endpoints connected to data centres via communication channels with insufficient security layers. OT network security relies on physical isolation of the whole communication infrastructure. However, this approach’s sufficiency is questioned in the threats landscape where elements of the OT network could be physically accessed by an adversary or destroyed by an attacker.
2. Key challenges and root causes #
The previously described factors create a range of problems on their own and combined, and should therefore be addressed holistically.
The main problem is the loss of connectivity to control rooms and data centres, which in the case of physical damage, can lead to a loss of grid visibility and control. This happens due to TSO’s main reliance on physically isolated airgapped communication channels (often combined with high-voltage lines), without availability of reserved wire-independant communication infrastructure. As a result, TSO risks the ability to get telemetry and deliver commands to remote objects.
Moreover, personnel operating grids face constant risk of death or injury while restoring and maintaining equipment. This is primarily due to constant drone and missile attacks on the critical infrastructure. In this sense, one of the key challenges is to ensure the security of the personnel who manage the energy system by eliminating and reducing the time they spend in the open air under the risk of attack.
Unprotected protocols have been the source of numerous real attacks on critical infrastructure, repeatedly in Ukraine. For example, Industroyer (2016) and Industroyer2 (2022) both directly communicated with substation equipment using IEC 60870-5-104.

Allocation of different types of threats in the TSO
3. How the problem can be solved #
The previously detailed challenges could be addressed by virtualising existing airgapped OT infrastructure while making its physical presence more flexible, and therefore easier to migrate and replace. Physically deployed networks could be replaced with publicly available internet. Thus, the ideal solution should ensure:
- Secure communication between energy objects and regional/national data centers, employing zero-trust architecture and cross-domain security best practices, while using untrusted networks. This would allow grid operators to build a reserved communication channel for managing a grid in case the OT network is not available.
- Redundant communication channels across independent internet service providers, with network latency kept within acceptable limits.
- Ability to manage the whole virtualised IT setup in remote mode with minimum human presence on the energy objects. This would help reduce risk for the personnel operating the grid.
The ideal solution for national grid operators would also require these additional capabilities:
- Non-disruptive integration. The system should be deployed into a live national grid without interrupting operations. No equipment should be taken out of service, and no outage window could be needed.
- Cryptography with minimal performance impact. Encrypting network traffic should not slow data exchange so communication remains near real-time with acceptable latency.
- Flexible and secure routing of telemetry and commands between RTUs and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADAs) of TSOs.
- Operator-configured telemetry mapping. The operator’s staff should be able to configure protocol value mapping so subsequent telemetry changes do not depend on vendor availability.
- A platform-agnostic solution that can be migrated between different cloud providers and on-premises environments with minimal modifications.
While helping the Ukrainian power grid survive the attacks, we’ve designed and implemented one of possible solutions for secure OT virtualisation.
Our solution provides the ability to operate over open communication channels and public clouds to address the previously highlighted reliability and security threats.

Overall schema of OT virtualisation architecture.
OT virtualisation #
As previously noted, damage to physical channels can significantly impact energy grid operations. Accordingly, OT virtualisation over redundant public communication channels, supported by appropriate security controls and equipment integration, addresses these challenges. In addition, an OT virtualisation solution helps mitigate most single points of failure across the system.
The solution establishes and maintains a reserve, virtualised copy of the operator’s data acquisition and supervisory capability. The copy runs as software on general-purpose infrastructure. Kept live and up to date, its state matches the primary environment, rather than being restored from a backup. Operations can move to the reserve copy when the primary environment becomes unavailable, compromised, or no longer trusted.
Traffic carrying telemetry and commands is transmitted over public networks, including the public internet. To maintain high connectivity during communication channel outages, we use multiple channels in parallel. This approach reduces confidentiality and integrity risks while increasing the whole solution’s availability. Accordingly, we are designing a topology with as few single points of failure as possible.
Besides that, each endpoint authenticates the other, and the payload is encrypted between them, so a carrier on the path sees only ciphertext and routing information. These measures also address the challenges highlighted in section 1.3.
The underlying network does not have to be private, dedicated, or trusted, as the protection does not depend on any of these characteristics.
To ensure secure operation over public communication networks, the solution applies three principles:
- Zero trust network access. Every connection is independently authenticated and authorised. Network location grants no privileges: a device inside the operator’s own network has no more rights than one arriving from the public internet.
- Zero trust in the underlying cloud infrastructure. From an architectural point of view, all components are authenticated to one another, and granular security controls are built on top of the cloud platform. For data confidentiality and integrity, all traffic and storage data are encrypted, so the infrastructure running the system is never in a position to read or alter what it carries.
- Cross-domain security. Data is transferred between distinct security domains under controlled and verified conditions. Connecting two domains does not merge them; data is strictly classified and validated while passing through data gateways.

How data-secured data transfer is arranged

Application of multi-layered security architecture
Station boxes and fleet management #
The whole perimeter of virtualised OT networks should be protected, including TSO SCADA and substations’ edge devices. As part of the solution, specialised station boxes are deployed across the grid network to provide a secure communication layer between field equipment and the central control infrastructure. The station boxes enable telemetry to be securely connected from RTUs and for control commands to be delivered back to them.
The distributed nature of station boxes and their associated risks prompted the development of a dedicated fleet management subsystem. This subsystem safeguards substation devices throughout their lifecycle, including in contested and disconnected environments.
Two conditions shape how this solution works, both of which arose from working under pressure:
- Every step can be carried out during an attack, while dispatchers and engineers are in shelter. Setup, deployment, monitoring, taking equipment out of service, and removal can all be performed remotely. No one needs to be near the equipment or seated at a console in the control room.
- In a crisis, the system is built to minimise the number of manual steps required. During a rocket attack, the individuals who would normally take those steps are not at their desks.
The whole solution should additionally address the risk of a station box being captured. Accordingly, the following requirements have been incorporated into the solution:
- Physical access to the enclosure should leave visible evidence for the operator, while giving the attacker nothing they can use.
- Keys and configuration must not be readable from the device. Removing the storage or reading the memory must not allow them to be recovered.
- Every device must be cryptographically unique. Secrets taken from one device must open only on that device—not the fleet, the control centre, or another site’s traffic.
- It must be impossible to clone the device.
- Devices must be protected against tampering intended to modify their operating mode and/or data.
- Revocation must work remotely and immediately. The operator must be able to cut a captured device out of the network without travelling to it, and the rest of the network must continue running once it is removed.
4. Impact of OT virtualisation #
Deploying OT virtualisation provided the national transmission system operator with the following advantages:
- Losing connectivity through the main communication channels does not mean losing the system. Telemetry and commands run over three independent communication channels, and operation continues unless all three are absent at the same time.
- If the grid is partly destroyed, supervision will continue over components that are still reporting, which provides additional ability to manage grid islanding mode.
- An additional level of OT network flexibility was introduced. A new source of telemetry can be brought online quickly, before the main OT infrastructure is extended to reach that point. A telemetry feed can also be redirected to a different recipient, so a SCADA migration does not require rebuilding the feed.
These measures have helped strengthen the energy grid’s resilience and partially reduced the duration of blackouts.
5. Learnings #
Building this capability within the Ukrainian power grid gave us experience that also applies to security engineering in peacetime. Security was a driver for moving old airgapped OT systems onto modern open infrastructure. At the same time, security is the main bottleneck, which requires a lot of creative engineering, rather than standard templates.
Moving OT infrastructure to the cloud and open telco infrastructure opens new use cases and brings new challenges. To build virtually isolated systems that work in practice, teams need to understand cross-domain security in data analysis and apply zero trust: no user, component, or data flow is trusted by default, and every exchange between domains is checked.
Airgapped systems were protected by being cut off. Once they connect to shared networks and platforms, that protection is gone, and security controls have to take its place. Every new connection, data flow, and access path must be justified and protected before it goes live. This is why security opens the way for modernisation—and also sets its pace.
In the cloud, OT data can be used for monitoring, analytics, and remote operation that a closed network did not allow. The same data now crosses domains with different levels of trust: control systems, corporate IT and external platforms. Virtual isolation holds only if every crossing is controlled: data is filtered and checked at each boundary, access is granted per task, and nothing is trusted because of where it sits on the network.
Above all, the key is how fast the team adapts: threats and risks change all the time, and the system’s security depends on responding to these challenges as quickly as they appear.
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